<oai_dc:dc xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:creator>Ghesla, Claus</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Grieder, Manuel</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Schmitz, Jan</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Stadelmann, Marcel</dc:creator>
  <dc:date>2020</dc:date>
  <dc:description xmlns:ns0="xml" ns0:lang="en">This paper reports evidence from a field experiment investigating households’ electricity saving behavior. We motivated households’ efforts to save electricity via pro-environmental incentives that did not affect people’s monetary utility but targeted their environmental preferences. The results show that such pro-environmental incentives can be effective, especially when framed as potential losses to the environment. Our loss-framed pro-environmental incentive led households to save 5% on their monthly electricity consumption compared to a control group.</dc:description>
  <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
  <dc:identifier>https://sonar.unidistance.ch/global/documents/322728</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>https://n2t.net/ark:/51647/srd1322728</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>https://sonar.unidistance.ch/documents/322728/files/SSRN-id3186068.pdf</dc:identifier>
  <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  <dc:relation>https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301421519307177</dc:relation>
  <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/ark/51647/srd1322728</dc:relation>
  <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
  <dc:rights>License undefined</dc:rights>
  <dc:source>Energy Policy. - 2020, vol. 137, p. 111131</dc:source>
  <dc:title xmlns:ns1="xml" ns1:lang="en">Pro-Environmental Incentives and Loss Aversion: A Field Experiment on Electricity Saving Behavior</dc:title>
  <dc:type>http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501</dc:type>
</oai_dc:dc>
